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Musical Aspects of
Auditory Imagery

Andrea R. Halpern
Bucknell University

Convincing people that they experience auditory imagery for music is not diffi
cult. When I tell people that I study auditory imagery, be they psychologists,
musicians, neither, or both, they often ask me how they can stop tunes from
running through their head. Unfortunately, I have no expert answer for them. But
anyone who has experienced such an annoy ance will agree that auditory imagery,
or "sounds in the head," is at least as vivid as the "pictures in the head" of visual
imagery. This vividness is also illustrated by an item on an auditory imagery
questionnaire that I employed in one of the studies described later on. It asked
respondents to imagine the sound of fingernails scraping a chalkboard and to rate
the image for vividness. You may not be surprised that many people reacted with
shivers and remonstrations, as if I had actually done the obnoxious deed.
Despite this strong subjective experience, very little research has explored the
nature of auditory imagery. From the subjective point of view, most people will
agree that auditory imagery for music seems to extend in time, to have an
identifiable tempo, and to have an identifiable pitch. The goal of my recent
research has been to try to specify the characteristics of auditory imagery, partic
ularly for music. The success of such an enterprise would be a valuable addition
to two extant literatures: that in music cognition and that in visual imagery
research.
TESTING MUSICAL MEMORY
People interested in music cognition have naturally been concerned with the
primary question: How is music represented in the mind? To answer this ques1
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tion, the modal technique has been to present subjects a novel snippet of music,
and then to ask some questions about it. Because asking for recall in music
experiments invites problems in scoring (errors of representation versus produc
tion) and subject cooperation, typically the subject is asked to recognize or
compare the recently presented extract with a new one. The independent variable
is the extent to which the old and new selections are similar. For instance, if a
listener fails to discriminate between a tune and one similar to it in contour,
researchers conclude that the contour of both selections must have been ab
stracted and remembered (e.g., Dowling, 1978).
Two methodological principles are evident in this approach. One is that ob
serving the learning of novel music is both instructive for the researcher and
relevant to some of the subject's everyday musical tasks. Clearly, presenting
experimenter-constructed music for learning confers all the usual advantages of
experimental control. All subjects have uniform conditions for learning, and the
characteristics of the stimuli can be precisely controlled. Also, learning and
remembering stimulus melodies, despite their artificial construction, is in many
ways similar to learning new music in real world situations. Simply understand
ing a later part of a new piece often requires memory of an earlier part, as in the
theme and variation form (Pollard-Gott, 1983). And although no one probes
memory for the new works as concert goers leave the hall, no doubt some
memory traces are laid down during the perfonnance, which probably could be
assessed by implicit memory tasks.
Underlying this way of examining music cognition is the second principle,
which is that memory in these situations is imperfect, and we gain insight by
examining these imperfections. This is a standard approach to studying memory
and one that has yielded much interesting information about the schematic nature
of memory, that is, the order of priority in memory representations when only
some information is retained. As an example of this type of research, I composed
melodies that varied from one another only on one musical dimension, such as
rhythm, contour, or modality (Halpern, 1984). After learning the melodies,
subjects tried to identify them. The error pattern revealed that tunes of different
contours were rarely confused with each other, whereas tunes identical except for
modality (major vs. minor) were more frequently confused, especially among
nonmusicians. Thus I concluded that contour was a salient dimension in the
schematic memory representation but modality was less strongly encoded.
Thinking of music memory as schematic is probably accurate for many of the
interactions that both trained and untrained people have with music. However,
recently I have become interested in the nature of representation when memory
for music is essentially perfect. Whereas it appears that the majority of work in
music cognition has examined short-term memory, I would like to examine long
tenn memory. By this I mean that I am interested in the way well-learned music
is represented. People are able to remember a large repertory of music and retain
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it for many years (Bartlett & Snelus, 1980). What kinds of codes make this
retention possible? Clearly, proposing verbal codes in the traditional sense is
impractical when trying to understand memory for melody (as opposed to the
lyrics in vocal music). Even if we assume that a small minority of musicians can
encode tunes in terms of musical structure, motor commands, or musical nota
tion, the successful retention of music by untrained people suggests the existence
of other types of durable codes. The explication of those codes has been the goal
of my current program of research.
The study of auditory imagery for music also dovetails with a second literature
on visual imagery. Studies in visual imagery have often been concerned with the
literal or analogue properties of visuo-spatial representations. So, for example,
various authors have examined the size and shape of the mental visual field
(Finke & Kosslyn, 1980), the subjective size of visual images (Kosslyn, 1978),
the representation of depth (Pinker, 1980), and the order of construction of the
images (Kosslyn, Cave, Provost, & von Gierke, 1988).
Some authors have proposed that visual imagery and visual perception share
characteristics or even a common locus in the visual system (e.g., Finke, 1985).
Farah (1988) has documented a number of physiological similarities between
imaging and perceiving in both intact and brain damaged people. In addition to
the intrinsic interest of this comparison, the extent to which we can compare
visual imagery and perception facilitates studying the former because of the
essentially private or introspective nature of imagery. On the other hand, at least
part of the perceptual experience, the stimulus, is public and therefore measur
able.
For these same reasons, the study of auditory imagery is not only interesting
in itself, but invites fruitful comparisons with both auditory perception and visual
imagery. The research reported here attempts to expand methods and findings
from visual imagery research to auditory imagery, which is a comparatively
unstudied phenomenon. Auditory and visual imagery are similar in that both are
terms used for sometimes quite vivid quasi-perceptual experiences. However,
intrinsic differences in the two modalities prevent a simple extension of methods
from one to the other. The most obvious difference is that visual stimuli are
extended in space, and we think that visual images represent that extension .
Auditory stimuli are extended in time, and we may hypothesize that auditory
images represent this corresponding extension.
This extension in time rather than space requires a different approach to
experimentation. Auditory stimuli are ephemeral and dynamic, making mental
manipulations more reliant on short-term memory and therefore more difficult
than in the visual domain. For example, participants in an auditory experiment
have to use short-term memory even to keep the recognition alternatives in focal
attention, a trivial matter in most visual situations. Thus the questions an experi
menter can put to subjects in an auditory imagery paradigm are more constrained
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than those in visual task . Particularly in auditory imagery for music, tasks might
require a higher level of mu ical training for success than is desirable when the
goal is to assess a general population.
The issue of training i another point of difference between the two
modalities. One attractive aspect of tudying auditory imagery for music is the
opportunity to examine different levels of training in the subject population. For
the mo r part, the research described here does not use subjects selected for their
musical training. However selecting people with various training levels can help
answer whether auditory imagery abilities are universal, or if they are correlated
with musical tuition.
The research described here derives from an interest in finding out to what
extend the "tune inside the head" is a veridical experience. That is, does an
auditory image of a tune exist in real time, with representations of tempo and
pitch? Are the e analogue representations used only in response to an experi
menter' instructions, or are they spontaneously generated when mental com
parisons of tunes are required? After describing work so far accomplished, I end
by describing some studies in progress that extend the findings to the neuropsy
chological domain.
Temporal Extent
Just as the representation of spatial extension is of interest in studies of visual
imagery, so i the extension and ordering in time important in auditory inforrna
rion processing. Consider the difficulty of trying to imagine "Jingle BeUs" from
the second phrase ("O'er the fields ... ") without thinking of the first phta e of
the song ("Dashing through... ").
The approach taken in the first experiment of the series in Halpern (1988a)
was modeled on the visual scanning study by Kosslyn, Ball, and Reiser (l 978).
In that study, subjects memorized a map of a fictional island that displayed
features such as a beach, a hut, and a well. After subjects could accurately
reproduce the map, Kosslyn and colleagues gave them a scanning task. As
subjects heard the name of a map feature, they were to image the map and
mentally focu on the feature.They then heard a second feature. If the feature
was in fact included on the map, the task was to mentally scan to the second
feature by imagining a little black speck moving from place to place. Subjects
pressed a button wben they "arrived'' at the econd place. If mental canoing is
analogous to physical scanning, then time to push the button should increase with
real distance on the map. This is in fact what happened, but only if subjects were
specifically in tructed to use imagery. lf not, time to an wer bore no relation to
real distance between the features.I borrowed this technique in my initial series
of experiments to see if temporal extent could be inferred in an auditory imagery
task, as Kosslyn, Ball, and Reiser inferred spatial extent in Lheirs.
In most of these studies, undergraduates unselected for musical training or
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ability were employed, as the goal was to assess how ordinary people remember
tunes. In the first study, lyrics to the beginning of three songs familiar to this
population were used ("Do Re Mi," "The Star Spangled Banner," and "Hark
the Herald Angels Sing"). These were chosen because each has the beginning or
only syllable of a lyric falling unambiguously on odd-numbered beats. For in
stance, beats 1, 3, and 5 for "The Star-Spangled Banner" fall on the words "oh,"
"can," and "see," respectively. In addition, each song has unique words in its
first phrase, so that a particular lyric refers to only one place in the song.
For each song, lyrics beginning on beats 1, 3, and 5 (variable that I refer to as
"startpoint") were paired with lyrics 2, 4, 6, or 8 beats away ("stepsize") to
comprise the "true" trials. In addition, a "false" trial was yoked to each "true"
trial by replacing the second lyric in the pair by one resembling the true lyric.
Subjects were first asked about their familiarity with the songs and lyrics, so
that we could be sure that participants were using long-term memory representa
tions. Each trial consisted of presenting the name of one of the three songs,
followed one second later by the first lyric of a pair and, after 750 msec, the
second lyric. In the imagery condition, subjects were instructed to first "men
tally focus" on the first lyric. Then they decided if the second lyric was a lyric in
the song. If it wasn't, they were to press the False button on a response board as
quickly and accurately as possible. If the second lyric was indeed in the song,
subjects followed imagery instructions to "start" at the first lyric and "mentally
play" the song until they "arrived" at the second lyric and pressed the True
button. In the nonimagery condition, subjects were simply told to mentally focus
on the first lyric, and when the second lyric appeared, to indicate whether it was
or was not an actual song lyric by pressing the appropriate button.
Figure 1.1 shows the mean reaction time for each correct "true" trial. Note
the main effect of group: The imagery group took longer to respond than the non
imagery group. This suggests that the imagery instructions caused that group to
act differently from the non-imagery group, and is consistent with findings in the
visual imagery literature that images take some time to form (Kosslyn, Cave,
Provost, & von Gierke, 1988). As predicted, reaction time increased with step
size. The increase had both linear and quadratic components, as it was positively
accelerated with larger stepsizes. The fact that both groups showed the increase
with stepsize implies that non-imagery subjects may also use analogue represen
tations even when not so instructed.
One other difference between the two groups was that reaction time increased
with startpoint, but only under imagery instructions. This implies that imagery
subjects are slower to process parts of the song that occur farther from the
beginning, as if they need to "run through" the initial part of the song before
beginning the trial. Note that even the imagery instructions made no mention of
starting the song from the beginning.
Thus, with or without imagery instructions, reaction time increased with
increasing number of beats in the real stimulus song. This suggests that subjects
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FIG. 1.1. Mean reaction time as a function of startpoint, stepsize, and
instruction group in the scanning experiment. Reprinted from Halpern
(1988a).

were operating on a representation of the song in real time. The lack of a
startpoint effect in the non-imagery group may mean that subjects do not always
need to process the beginning of a song when mental work is required on a
middle portion of it. However, I should also note that of the many versions and
replications of this task conducted at about the same time, only in this instance
did the lartpoint effect fail to obtain. One i compelled then to consider this lack
of an effect an exception.
In subsequent versions of the task, we showed that the results did not depend
on auditory imagery ability, as assessed by the questionnaire mentioned earlier
(the usual pattern with visual imagery), nor on the extent of reported imagery use
during the experiment. And finally, subject claimed to be unaware of the manip
ulations and hypothesis of the experiment, so that we are fairly confident that the
data were not the result of mere subject cooperation.
However, the results in the scanning task do not imply a specifically musical
representation. Subject could have perfonned the task by looking up a list of the
correct lyrics, or perhaps by using a list of vi ual repre entations of lyric or
notes. The next experiment probed specifica!]y for a mu ical representation of
the songs by using a mental pitch comparison task. The pitch comparison task
requires subjects to process the first lyric in each trial, whereas previously, a
subject could produce the correct answer without following instructions to "men
tally focus" on the first lyric.
This type of task is modeled on another variety of visual imagery task, where
imagery effects are elicited without necessarily giving imagery instructions. For
instance, in the well-known mental rotation tasks first devised by Roger Shepard
and colleagues, subjects are asked whether one object is the same as or different
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from another identical object that has been transformed by a rotation in the
picture plane or depth (Shepard & Metzler, 1971). Subjects are not explicitly told
about the transformations nor directed to use imagery. Nevertheless, the time
taken to answer varies directly with the degree of rotation that separates the two
objects in the real world. This finding has been interpreted as evidence for the
analogue nature of visual imagery: imagining point A and then point C requires
real-time processing of any intermediate points B.
Devising an auditory equivalent of mental rotation illustrates the difficulty,
referred to in the Introduction, of traversing the two modalities. In the visual
task, the two objects to be compared can be presented simultaneously on a
screen, thus removing any memory load. Presenting two sounds simultaneously
simply results in a confusing percept, or a third percept emerging from the two
components, such as a major chord emerging from presentation of a C, E, and G
sounded together. An additional problem results from the difficulty in labeling
parts of an auditory representation. In the Kosslyn, Ball, and Reiser (1978)
experiment, parts of the map were labeled with the feature name. For music, a
convenient way to label is to use only songs (not instrumental music) and allow
the lyrics to serve as labels for the notes. This unfortunately confines us to using
sung music, which puts us at risk for actually testing text memory. But at least
the pitch comparison task requires that the lyrics be used only indirectly as a
means of locating the notes that are being compared.
Eight songs were selected that fulfilled the requirements of familiarity and
beat placement noted in the previous experiment. For each of the 12 trial types
(three startpoints and four stepsizes), the two component lyrics represented dif
ferent pitches in the actual song. For instance, in "The Star-Spangled Banner"
the note on the word "by" (beat 7) is higher in pitch than the note on the word
"can" (beat 3).
Familiarization of the songs and lyrics, plus a demonstration of what "higher"
and "lower" in pitch means, preceded the experiment. For each trial, subjects
saw a song title, followed by the first lyric. The first lyric was always the closer
of the two lyrics to the beginning of the song. After 500 msec, the second lyric
appeared. To see whether imagery effects depended on instructions in this task,
two groups were used. Subjects in the imagery group were told to "begin with
the first lyric and play through the song in your mind until you reach the second
lyric." Both groups were told to compare the pitch of lyric 2 with that of lyric 1 ,
and press either the "higher" o r "lower" button o n a response board.
Although all subjects claimed to understand the task, this experiment differed
dramatically from the previous one in its difficulty. Data from seven of 40
subjects were discarded because of error rates of 40% or over. The mean error
rate of the remaining subjects was 24%, compared to 6% for the previous
experiment. A post hoc division of the subjects by a median split of their years of
training (mdn = 5.5 years) showed only that musicians were more accurate than
nonmusicians (19% vs. 29% errors), but this factor did not interact with any
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others. As error rates in tasks like mental rotation are typically quite low, we see
here an example of what I believe is the inherent higher level of difficulty in
auditory imagery experiments. No differences in speed were found between
musicians and nonmusicians.
Considering reaction time (RT) , the type of instruction had absolutely no
effect on the results, and so Fig. I. 2 shows data combined over groups in the left
hand panel. Reaction time increased as a function of both stepsize and startpoint,
even more clearly than before. This effect is particularly compelling when one
considers that only 76% of the data could be analyzed. The startpoint effect is
quite clear for stepsizes 4, 6, and 8, but disappears at stepsize 2. This was also
evident in Fig. I. I for the previous experiment. One explanation is that lyrics
only two beats away from one another may be part of the same syntactic structure
or musical motive. The two components may be so associated that the task may
not require any time-consuming serial processing.
Turning now to the error pattern shown in the right-hand panel, once again
instruction type made no difference in results, so the data are combined over
groups. Error rate did change as a function of stepsize, but it only increased for
Stepsizes 4 through 8. There was no effect of startpoint.
There was a Startpoint by Stepsize interaction, which appeared to show a
decrease of errors at Stepsize 4. Post-hoc inspection of trials showed that the
average pitch ,w�aration, in semitones, was largest for trials of stepsize 4. Per
haps this could explain the lower error rate if we assumed a symbolic distance
effect. In auditory perception, tones close to one another in pitch are maximally
interfering with one another (Dewar, Cuddy, & Mewhort, 1977). Thus a second10D00
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FIG. 1.2. Mean reaction time and error rate as a function of startpoint
and stepsize in the mental pitch comparison task. Collapsed across
instruction groups. Reprinted from Halpern, (1988a).

�
Q)

<ii
a:

�
.,"
C

1.

n are typically quite low, we see
ent higher level of difficulty in
in speed were found between
f instruction had absolutely no
;ombined over groups in the left
n of both stepsize and startpoint,
1rticularly compelling when one
nalyzed. The startpoint effect is
ears at stepsize 2. This was also
t. One explanation is that lyrics
1rt of the same syntactic structure
! so associated that the task may
11g.
he right-hand panel, once again
so the data are combined over
tepsize, but it only increased for
startpoint.
:ion, which appeared to show a
,ection of trials showed that the
gest for trials of stepsize 4. Per
we assumed a symbolic distance
e another in pitch are maximally
Mewhort, 1977). Thus a second---------.so
Errors

,o

30

�

Stepslze

1te as a function of startpoint
·ison task. Collapsed across
rn, (1988a).

MUSICAL ASPECTS OF AUDITORY IMAGERY

9

ary analysis examined whether tones close together in pitch would be more
difficult to compare mentally. In fact, error rates did decrease with increasing
pitch separation, from 26% for pitch separations of 1 or 2 semitones, to 11% for
pitch separations of 9 or 10 semitones. However, this was a weak relationship, as
only the low 11% error rate was statistically different from the other rates by a
Newman-Keul's test.
Because the pitch separation factor in the above experiment was added post
hoc, the next study in the series probed specifically for a symbolic distance effect
in mental pitch comparison. In order to keep the stimulus set at a reasonable
size and still fulfill the strict stimulus constraints necessary in all these studies,
only stepsizes 4, 6, and 8 were used; and a new factor of pitch separation was
added: 1 or 2 semitones, 3 or 4 semitones, 5 or 6 semitones, and 7 or 8
semitones. Startpoint was dropped as a formal factor (though startpoint was
balanced over stepsize and pitch separation insofar as it was possible). Because
imagery instructions did not interact with any factors in the previous experiment,
only one instruction group was included, which did not receive imagery instruc
tions.
Data from 2 of 20 subjects with error rates over 40% were discarded; the mean
error rate of the remaining subjects was 22%. The usual stepsize effect obtained
here in reaction times: They increased significantly from Stepsize 4 (4,787 msec)
to Stepsize 6 (5,974 msec) to Stepsize 8 (6,486 msec). Means for the pitch
separation categories appeared to be ordered in the predicted direction: They
decreased monotonically from the smallest (5,910 msec) to the largest (5,400
msec) categories. However, this decrease was not statistically significant.
Mean error rates for the smallest to the largest pitch separation categories
were 31%, 21%, 15% and 21%, respectively. These differed from one another,
but a Newman-Keuls test revealed that only the 31% error rate for the closest
pitch separation was statistically different from the other three.
We see then that the predicted effect of pitch separation was modestly sup
ported, especially for error rates. One inevitable confound when using natu
ralistic materials is the inability to balance song over all the other factors. In the
first experiment in the series, song was completely balanced over the other
factors, but this confined us to using only three songs. In that study, there was a
main effect of song and one interaction involving song, which fortunately did not
prevent the emergence of the more interesting effects. Nevertheless, without
balancing for song, weak effects like pitch separation may be obscured. A natural
extension of this work would be to compose experimental materials where all the
factors are neatly balanced. The challenge would be to show that participants can
learn novel music and words as well as they know "Rudolph the Red-Nosed
Reindeer," so that we can legitimately claim that we are still studying auditory
imagery for well-known music.
One final unpublished study in the series examined whether the stepsize effect
was merely an artifact of using serially-structured songs as stimuli. In this study,
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lyrics were either presented in the order of appearance in the song ("oh" fol
lowed by "dawn's" in "The Star Spangled Banner"), or in the reverse order. The
mental pitch comparison task was run without imagery instructions. The hypoth
esis was that the reverse condition would prevent people from simply scanning
the song in a serial fashion, leading to a slow and flat reaction time function with
stepsize. This is in fact what happened. The reverse condition was slower than
the forward condition, and reaction time did not vary as a function of stepsize
with reverse presentation (the usual stepsize function obtained in the forward
condition).
Comparing the two types of experiments described in this section, we see that
changing the task so that a musical judgment is required considerably increased
the difficulty level but did not substantially change the reaction time patterns
from the scanning experiments. In this second task, reaction times increased with
greater distance between the to-be-judged notes and also increased with the
starting point of the first lyric, suggesting that intermediate notes were being
processed, regardless of the instructions given to the subjects. Perhaps this more
difficult task is almost impossible unless an imagery representation is employed.
The apparent inevitability of this strategy is even more interesting considering
that in actual pitch comparison tasks, intervening tones can have a large disrup
tive effect (Deutsch, 1970, 1972). Blackbum (cited in Dowling & Harwood,
1986) found the disruption even when the target tone was imagined. Efficient
performance on a mental pitch comparison task ought to include bypassing the
intervening tones in memory.
Also interesting is the weaker propensity to access an auditory image from its
beginning regardless of what part of the representation is being probed. Again,
efficient performance on the tasks ought to include being able to minimize short
term memory load by accessing the representation at the most appropriate place.
Taken altogether, the results of these experiments begin to support the claim
that auditory imagery is not only a strong subjective experience (subjects never
objected to carrying out auditory imagery tasks), but is also at least partly
quantifiable. People indeed behave as if they were running songs through their
heads. That is, the evidence seems to point towards a representation that codes
extension in time, that unfolds in real time, that has strong links between adja
cent elements, and that is unidirectionally ordered.
This should not be taken as a claim that serial processing is always obligatory.
Thus I don't claim that we need to mentally play the first three movements of
Beethoven's Ninth Symphony in order to think about the final "Ode to Joy"
movement. It is very likely that hierarchical representations for music also exist
that link motives to phrases to sections to movements. In the visual domain,
researchers have proposed that these two types of representation coexist in our
knowledge about maps. We have already seen Kosslyn's (Kosslyn, Ball, &
Reiser, 1978) evidence that we can represent maps in analogue fashion. But
others (Stevens & Coupe, 1978; Tversky, 1981) have shown that we encode maps
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If a tune is extended in time, we may next ask whether the tempo, or the speed of
that extension, is also represented in a consistent way. At least two types of
anecdotal observations suggests that this is so. First, although people may be
lieve that a synchronized musical performance requires the presence of a conduc
tor, ensembles can function without a conductor at all. Ensembles such as rock
bands, chamber choirs, string quartets, and church congregations may designate
one member to begin and end pieces but otherwise operate without formal
leadership. In order to synchronize their performances, members of musical
groups must have some representation of the tempo of the piece in question.
Second, people report anecdotally that their auditory images seem to have a
specific tempo associated with them.
Clearly, representation of the tempo is hard to account for by using symbolic
verbal codes. Perhaps tempo is represented literally in the auditory image. The
question asked in the next studies was whether people represent a constant or
preferred tempo of a tune when they claim to be imaging it. In one attempt to
answer this question, Clynes and Walker (1982) had musicians tap their finger to
imagined music that had been extensively studied in notated form (where tempo
is specified by the composer), and found a very stable tapping rate compared to
tapping without imagined music. Interestingly, they also found that most of the
musicians imagined the tempo more slowly than when they actually played the
music on the piano.
We may ask whether ordinary people h�ve an experience of mental tempo
when recalling familiar tunes that are known to subjects from many contexts and
in many versions, and thus unlikely to have one tempo associated with them. In
order to test the idea that tempo is consistently represented, we have to test
several stronger hypotheses: that preferred tempo will be similar whether listen
ing or imagining music, and that preferred tempos will be stable across time.
Given that subjects show some stability in their selected tempos, we can see if
constraints on the representation exist by asking people to mentally transform
tempos until they reach upper and lower bounds.
The first study in the series (Halpern, 1988b) tested whether subjects pre
ferred a particular tempo for familiar songs, both when the songs were actually
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heard and when they were merely imagined. The 19 timulus song were similar
to those I u ed previously. Examples are "Do Re Mi," "Happy Birthday," and
"Yesterday.' Thu , the represented tempo should not be tied to a memory for any
particular version, a might be the case with a current rock tune heard on one
recording or a symphony, where tempo is u ually notated.
Even more than in the previous studies, it was important that the experimenter
and the subject agreed on the placement of beat to the lyrics. Therefore in the
familiarization phase subjects clapped along with the lyrics. Any clapping pat
tern different than the intended one wa corrected by the experimenter. In the
Perception task, participants interacted with a computer. They first heard the tune
at a very slow tempo. The computer program allowed the listeners to change the
tempo until the song sounded "correct" to them. 1n the Imagery task, subject
were given a list of song titles. They were instructed to imagine the tune in their
head and to et a metronome to coincide with the beats in the imagined tune. All
subjects performed both tasks in counterbalanced order.
The scattergram in Fig. 1..3 show that people used a wide range of tempos:
70 to 140 beats per minute (bpm). The tempo ettings for the 19 songs averaged
across subjects differed from one another in both task , meaning that people were
differentiating among the songs. Considering all the songs as a group, the means
and variability of the imagined and perceived tempos did not di.ffer.
Looking at individual songs in the two tasks, and as in evident from the
Figure, perceived and imagined tempos were positively correlated (r = .63).
Only 3 of the 19 songs had equal tempos in the two tasks (as mea ured by taking
the ratio of imagined to perceived tempos and testing each against the hypo
thetical ratio of 1.00). For 7 of the songs, imagined tempos were faster than
perceived: for 9, perceived tempos were faster than imagined, refuting Clynes
and Walker s (1982) finding that imagined tempos are usually slower than per-
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ceived. However, the average absolute value of the difference between tempo
setting in the two tasks was small , 20 bpm, relative to the range of tempos used
in the tasks, 40 to 208 bpm. It is interesting to note that the average perceived and
imagined tempos were about 100 bpm, or 600 msec per beat. This figure is
commonly cited as being a "natural" or "preferred" rate for tapping, and the rate
at which temporal discrimination is easiest (Fraisse, 1982).
The experiment demonstrates that the task of externalizing imagined pitch
seemed logical to the subjects, and that imagining and perceiving tempo elicit
quite similar results. The interesting question is whether people maintain a stable
representation of tempo over time and repeated trials. If this strong hypothesis is
supported, then we have evidence for the weaker position that the tempos are
represented in the first place.
In the next study, previously unreported, participants imagined familiar songs,
and then tapped a finger to match the beat of the imagined tempo. The tempos
were tape-recorded and later matched to the nearest metronome setting to the
produced beat. By having subjects tap, instead of setting a metronome as in the
previous setting, we hoped to eliminate any possibility that verbal codes would
be used to remember the tempo from one observation to the next.
Each song was presented four times for judgment: Half the songs (Same
songs) were judged four times entirely within the first or second session; the
other half were judged twice in one session and twice again two to five days later.
The dependent measure was the average standard deviation of those judgments.
Control judgments consisted of sets of four Different songs judged within or
between sessions. This control set allowed us to determine whether people al
ways tap at a uniform rate, perhaps due to constraints on the motor system. If
people can only produce one or a few tempos, then naturally all their judgments
will have low variability. Separate groups of musicians and nonmusicians partici
pated. Because nonmusicians received slightly different instructions and more
practice, results will be reported separately.
Instead of reporting results in units of beats per minute, each metronome
setting was assigned a number from one to 40, to better capture the "closeness"
of adjacent metronome settings in the analysis. As can be seen in Fig. 1.4,
tempos for musicians were very stable both between and within sessions for
Same songs, with standard deviations of about 1.7 metronome settings (about 6
bpm). Also evident was that the standard deviation for groups of Different songs
was higher than that for Same songs. This shows that the subjects provided a
variety of tempos when judging sets of different songs . But the standard devia
tion for Different songs remained unchanged within or between sessions. In other
words, the range in tempo judgments among "Happy Birthday," "London
Bridge," "White Christmas," and "Do Re Mi" was wider than that for four tries
with "Happy Birthday," but the range remained stable within or over sessions.
The results for the nonmusicians apparently show less of an ability to keep a
stable tempo. As seen in Fig. 1.4, Same songs within sessions were given the
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FIG. 1.4. Stability of imagined tempos for musicians and nonmusi
cians; for same and different songs, both within and between ses
sions.

same tempo most of the time, SD = l.4 metronome settings. Nonmusicians were
differentiating Same from Different songs within a given session, showing that
they were sensitive to tempo stability under the easier condition. However,
variability of settings for Same songs across the sessions was as high as the
settings for Different songs.
A simple conclusion that nonmusicians can't maintain a stable tempo repre
sentation across sessions is hindered by the fact that variabilities were smaller in
general for the nonmusicians compared to the musicians. Inspection of the data
suggests that nonmusicians -used a smaller range of tempos throughout the ex
periment. For example, the average difference between the slowest song ("White
Christmas") and fastest song ("When the Saints Come Marching In") was 46
bpm for the musicians, but only 22 bpm for the nonmusicians. This difference in
what we might call flexibility of mental tempo also shows up in the next experi
ment.
The stability of tempo across sessions is then evidence that at least musicians
represent tempo with the auditory image. In the above two experiments, partici
pants were asked to imagine the songs at a preferred or usual tempo. To what
extent is this a rigid representation? Is the tempo subject to transformation under
appropriate instructions? At one extreme, we may predict that the "speed" with
which a song is imagined is subject to the same limits as auditory perception.
Bolton (1894) found that the subjective feeling of rhythm broke down when
intemote intervals were shorter than 115 msec or longer than 1,580 msec. The
fastest and slowest imaginable tempos may be of similar magnitude (or at the
extreme metronome settings of 228 msec per beat to 1,500 msec per beat) and
constant across song. At the other extreme, the representation of tempo may be
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so intrinsic to the song representation that subjects would have a difficult time
imagining tempos too far removed from the preferred ones.
A third experiment attempted to answer these questions. Ten familiar songs
served as stimuli, and participants were initially unselected for musical training.
As in the first study in this series, the subjects first used the metronome to find
the preferred tempo of the song. They then tried to imagine the song at faster and
faster tempos until the task became too difficult, followed by imagining the song
at slower and slower tempos (the order was reversed for half the subjects). For
the fast/slow tasks, the subjects started with the metronome at the preferred
tempo and moved the dial toward the fastest (208 bpm) or slowest ( 40 bpm)
metronome setting, as appropriate. Each time the subjects changed the tempo on
the metronome, they rated the difficulty of imagining the song at that tempo. The
ratings were on a four point scale, where "l" signified "very easy" and "4"
signified "very difficult". The subjects were told to record on their answer sheet
the first metronome setting receiving a rating of "4".
For each of the three tasks, mean tempo settings differed significantly among
the 10 songs. The mean fastest tempo of 164 bpm and slowest tempo of 65 bpm
did not approach the metronome limits of 208 and 40 bpm. This implies that
subjects were discriminating among the songs and not simply choosing the
extremes on the metronome for their answers.
The mean preferred tempo was 109 bpm. This is significantly faster than the
mean imagined tempo from Study 1 of 98 bpm. However, tempos in these two
studies were strongly correlated, r = .94; that is, subjects set tempos faster but in
a very similar ordering to the first study.
To answer the question of whether tempo representations are labile, we can
note that the values recorded for the slowest and fastest tempos were dependent
on the preferred tempo. Expressing this quantitatively, significant positive cor
relations were obtained among the different tasks here, as is obvious from Fig.
1.5. This implies that we are not dealing with an absolute limit on the speed with
which a tune is imagined. For instance, the mean fastest imaginable tempo for
"When the Saints Come Marching In" was 32 bpm faster than that for "White
Christmas."
However, the extent of mental tempo transformation does seem to have limits
dependent on both the song (as shown above) and the musical background of the
subject. When asked, most subjects agreed that at least some of the songs had
tempo "limits," beyond which it was difficult to imagine the songs. But the four
subjects with the most extensive musical backgrounds also were able to imagine
the songs at the most extreme tempos. The average difference between the fast
and slow tempos was 153 bpm for the four musicians, versus 87 bpm for
everyone else. What aspects of musical training may have allowed the greater
flexibility shown by the musicians in the last two studies? It is doubtful that the
musicians had had experience with this precise task in the course of their musical
education. They may have had experience in other sorts of msucial transforma-

16

HALPERN

'[ ,so
0
C.

E

�
� 100

Saints

Happy

This land Twinkle

London

Do Re /11.i Counlfy

Frere

White

Hey Jude

Song
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tions, however, such as practicing a piece slowly before. playing it up to speed.
Also, good mu icians need to be able to adju t tempos a a conductor searches
for the appropriate speed of an entire piece or varies the tempo within a piece.
Conductors themselves probably find that being able to imagine the sounds of
the orchestra from simply looking at the score to be a useful skill. Just as an
interior decorator would value the ability to imagine the sofa in different colors in
different locations before actually executing the plan, so would a conductor value
being able to imagine adding or subtracting instruments to the ensemble or
speeding up and slowing down the tempo. We may expect that conductor would
show the most flexibility in audHory imagery ta ks, and would make an interest
ing group to study.
In summary, th.ese studies expand on the previous findings that temporal
extent is represented in auditory imagery by specifying some of the charac
teristics of the temporal aspects of images. Ordinary people can extemalize the
"speed" of their internal images, and can differentiate among tbose tempos. To
an appreciable extent they, and even more so mu ician , are able to replicate that
tempo over long periods of time. These results strongly imply that tempo is
encoded in the long-term memory representation of familiar tunes. The small
advantage hown by musicians in maintaining that tempo may resuJt from prac
tice in being tempo setters for a group or for themselves. Nonmusicians less often
produce their own music in a group and singing in the shower does not require
consistent adherence to any one tempo.

Imagined Pitch
Few people possess what is called absolute or "perfect" pitch, the ability to name
a given played note or to produce a note when given its letter name ("A", "B
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flat"). Instead, almost all musicians and many untrained people possess a reason
ably well developed sense of relative pitch. These people can recognize the
correctness of a tune and perhaps produce good approximations of tunes they
have heard. They can do this because Western music is based for the most part on
the relationships of pitches to one another. For instance, when "W hite Christ
mas" is sung, the second note has to be one semitone, or 5.9% higher in
frequency than the first note, regardless of where the tune is started. And in most
musical contexts, the starting note of the piece is irrelevant. That is, "Happy
Birthday" is, in all important ways, the same whether starting on a low note or a
high note.
Yet in spontaneous singing, people do need to choose some starting pitch. Can
we verify the subjective impression that the imaginal representations of these
songs have something analogous to starting pitches? The next series of studies
(Halpern, 1989) explores whether people maintain a representation of the starting
pitch of familiar tunes. As was the case with imagined tempo, the strategy here
was to adopt a stronger hypothesis: that people not only associate a pitch with
imagined music, but that this pitch is fairly stable over trials and time. Keep in
mind that these studies never use absolute pitch subjects, and the stimuli are
traditional tunes like Christmas carols and children's songs, which are heard in
many different keys.
In the first study, people hummed the starting pitch of familiar songs. We
measured the variability of those judgments within sessions and between two
sessions separated by 48 hours. Using the same logic as in the mental tempo
studies, if pitch representation is stable, the variability of those judgments should
be small and about the same whether the observations are gathered close together
or far apart in time.
To select the subjects, a pre-test was used that screened out anyone who was
truly singing-disabled; that is anyone who could not hold a pitch steady enough
for us to measure. Otherwise, musical training was not considered, except that no
subjects participated who admitted to possessing absolute pitch. Both males and
females participated, and a comparison of their results will be of interest in
several of the studies.
The procedure was as follows: Subjects were shown a list of well-known
stimulus songs and asked to indicate familiarity. Then on each trial they were
presented with lyrics from the first phrase of a song. They were then asked to run
the first phrase of a song through their heads and think about the pitch of the first
note. W hen they had comfortably obtained this pitch, they hummed it into a tape
recorder, and the pitches were later transcribed into musical notation to the
nearest semitone. Subjects could redo any trial where they felt that the produced
pitch did not match the pitch they were imagining.
Several measures were taken to guard against the possibility that subjects were
using their memory of one production to influence the production of another trial
(either to produce the same pitch for the next observation of the same song, or to
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use relative pitch to produce a desired note for a different song). Each observa
tion was eparated from the next observation of the same song by at least three
intervening trials. Between each trial, a different set of interfering notes was
played on an electronic keyboard. To prevem vocalization of anything other than
the starting pitch subjects chewed gum (sugarles , with a choice of flavors). And
finally, subjects were asked at the end of the study if they thought their responses
on one trial were influenced by previous responses. No one o indicated.
Each song was presented four times for judgment: Half the song were judged
four times entirely within the first or second session· the other half were judged
twice in one session and twice again 48 hrs. later. The dependent measure wa
the average standard deviation (variability) of those judgment . Control judg
ments consisted of sets of four Different ·ongs judged across or between es
sions. Like in the tempo studies, this control set allowed us to determine whether
we were testing a bunch of "Johnny One-Notes," who would naturally show
artifactual low variability.
As hown in Fig. 1.6 variability for judgments among the Same songs was
low, whether between or within e sion . Variability among Different songs was
much higher showing that ubjects were sen itive to different tarting pitches
where appropriate. Thi too did not depend on whether the judgments were
between or within es ions. Also note that the absolute value of the variability
was mall for the Same songs, a little over one semitone.
As may be expected, males selected notes aboul an octave lower than did the
females. The highest and lowest pitched songs were logical choices in that the
highest average pitch was for "Joy to the World," which descends a whole octave
in its first phrase and the lowest pitch was reserved for "Somewhere Over the
Rainbow," whose first interval is an ascending octave.
If humming is an adequate externalization of mental pitch, then these results
3.o�-----·---------�
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point to a form of absolute pitch among ordinary people. But the use of the
production technique has some disadvantages. Our surprisingly consistent results
may have been partially due to the physical constraints imposed by using the
vocal organs for a response. The gender and song differences described in the
previous paragraph are consistent with this speculation. People may have pro
duced only pitches that would have been acceptable if they were actually singing.
On the other hand, perhaps stability was underestimated in subjects with poor
singing ability.
To complement the production paradigm, a second study used a recognition
task that eliminated the need for a vocal response. Subjects again thought of the
first note in the tune, but this time they searched for it on an electronic keyboard.
Since we wanted to make sure that participants couldn't see the note they picked
and then simply remember (or misremember) the note name, the keyboard was
placed upside down and hidden from view. In addition, all the other precautions
to discourage explicit memory codes were repeated from the first study. The
disadvantage of this paradigm is that playing all those notes while hunting for the
correct one might cause memory interference, and so the variabilities might all
be higher in this version. Two groups of subjects participated: an unselected
group ("general subjects") and a group of musicians.
And indeed, the results in Fig. 1. 7 shows that average standard deviations are
about twice as high in this version. Although the two panels of the graph look
identical, they in fact differ statistically. The results for musicians were the same
as those in the previous experiment: Variabilities for Same songs were smaller
than those for Different songs, whether between or within sessions. The general
subjects also showed this main effect of Same vs. Different song, and vari-
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FIG. 1.7. Mean standard deviations of pitch recognitions for same or
different songs, both between or within sessions, for musicians and
unselected subjects. Reprinted from Halpern (1989).
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abilities were equal between and within sessions for Different songs. However,
variabilities were significantly higher between than within sessions for Same
songs.
One could argue that both production and recognition tasks are uninteresting
from a cognitive point of view because subjects were just singing the songs to
themselves, and using muscular or other physical cues to retrieve the starting
notes of the pieces. Several secondary results argue against that claim. In the
production task, recall that males and females produced different pitches for the
songs. However, in the recognition task, gender had no effect on the pitches
selected in either group. Also, the songs given the highest and lowest starting
pitches were not obvious choices. "We W ish You a Merry Christmas" was given
the highest note, but it ascends in the first few notes. "The First Noel" was given
the lowest average pitch, and it descends in the first few notes.
Each of the two previous tasks might have favored people who are good at
singing, or at note-finding, respectively. Even if mental representations of the
pitches were adequate, a person with poor singing ability may have sung several
extraneous pitches before settling on a satisfactory one in the first study. In the
second study, a person with poor dexterity or one completely unfamiliar with
keyboards may have played more pitches per trial before selecting the appropri
ate one, thereby again generating more interference. Accordingly, a third experi
ment used an initial rating task to remove any requirements for output skills in
the main task.
First, subjects produced preferred notes for familiar songs, as in the first
experiment of the series. Two to five days later, they were read the name of one
of the four stimulus songs and told to imagine the first note of that song. A tone
was then played, and they were to rate the tone's similarity to the starting pitch
they were imagining. The presented tones included the subject's own preferred
pitch plus pitches one to seven semitones higher and lower in a random order.
Trials were not blocked by song so that successive trials created the usual desired
memory interference. Additional interference notes were played between each
trial. Each trial was repeated once, so each datum was the average of the two
observations.
If subjects maintain a stable representation of starting pitch, they should rate
their previously selected pitch as the most adequate note, and rate notes higher
and lower as less adequate. Of secondary interest is the pattern of the remaining
preference ratings. Krumhansl and Shephard (1979) found that two tones are
judged to be more similar if the interval between them is considered musically
small. For instance musical intervals of a fifth (7 semitones) and a fourth (5
semitones) are considered more highly related by music theoreticians and by
subjects than physically closer intervals such as a major second (2 semitones).
Returning to the current experiment, given that the previously selected preferred
note would be rated most highly, would the ratings of other pitches correspond to
the musical closeness of those pitches to the preferred one?
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Musicians and nonmusicians participated, but musical training made no dif
ference, and so Fig. 1.8 shows combined results.
The pattern of ratings resembles a series of peaks and valleys. Each peak was
significantly different from the more distant of its adjacent neighbors, and the
valleys were all different from their nearest peaks. Notice that the preferred note
was rated highly, but so were tones 4 semitones (major third) lower, 3 semitones
higher (minor third), and 7 semitones higher ( perfect fifth), relative to the pre
ferred note. This is interesting from a musical point of view because only the + 7
peak is musically close to the preferred tone. So rather than solely reflecting
musical closeness as defined by Western music theory, the pattern seems to
reflect preference regions of pitch height. It appears that people are willing to
pitch the entire piece up or down several semitones, but are less willing to accept
a starting note only one or two semitones away. This suggests a quite good
memory for the absolute pitch of the starting tone.
These results were essentially replicated in a follow-up study that omitted
specific imagery instructions. All subjects claimed that they played the song to
themselves before assigning a rating. Similar to the conclusions we reached after
analyzing the mental pitch comparison task, imagery processing appears to be a
highly preferred strategy when answering questions about the literal aspects of
music.
The final study in this series returned to the question of limits on mental
transformation of pitch, in the same way we explored the limits on tempo
transformation earlier. If limits on such transformations exist, we should again
see those limits being proportional to preferred pitches, rather than reflecting an
absolute bound on imagined pitches. A recognition paradigm was employed here
because one obviously wants to eliminate any constraints imposed by the vocal
apparatus itself.
As a first phase, musically unselected subjects chose preferred notes for
op
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familiar songs by hunting for the preferred note on a keyboard after imagining
the song. To elicit the highest and lowest imaginable pitch, the experimenter
played the previously selected preferred pitch, and then began playing suc
cessively higher (or lower) pitches in semitone increments. Half the subjects
received each task first. As in previous paradigms, subjects rated the difficulty of
imagining the song beginning on each presented pitch. And once again, interfer
ing notes were played between each trial.
As was true in the earlier recognition paradigm, males and females selected
the same pitches in all the tasks, confirming that subvocalization mechanisms are
insufficient to explain the results.
Similar to the results of the tempo transformation study, highest and lowest
imagined pitch depended on the preferred pitch (Fig. 1.9). Unfortunately, the
pitch range over songs in this study was too narrow to show many differences
between songs, but some information can be gained by looking at the songs
pitched the highest ("Joy to the World") and the lowest ("Row Row Row"). The
preferred, highest, and lowest settings for "Joy" were all higher than any other
song. "Row" had the lowest preferred setting, and its lowest setting was two
semitones below that for the next lowest songs. Thus we may tentatively con
clude that no absolute upper or lower bound exists for the range of imagined
pitches used here.
However, this study was the least informative of the series, and could be
strengthened by selecting sets of songs with a wider range of preferred pitches.
Alternatively, paradigms that don't depend on group averages would probably be
able to maximize the chances of finding a wider range of preferred pitches.
To summarize this section, four experiments required people of varying musi
cal backgrounds to externalize the pitch of an imagined tune. The tunes were all
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popular or traditional music, which had very probably been heard and performed
at many pitch levels by the participants in their past. Considering that people
without absolute pitch have difficulty remembering isolated tones, or tones in
unfamiliar melodies, performance in these experiments was indicative of consid
erable memory for an arbitrary starting pitch of familiar tunes. This claim is also
supported by data collected by Deutsch, Kuyper, and Fisher (1987). They found
that untrained subjects reliably and consistently perceived a musical pitch illu
sion whose interpretation relied on some knowledge of absolute pitch.
Although the argument in this chapter is that ordinary people store absolute
pitch to a greater extent than is commonly believed, this should not be tak�n to
mean that everyone has a mild case of what is traditionally called absolute pitch.
Clearly, verbal labels for notes were not used in these tasks, and consistency of
pitch judgment was not up to the level shown by true absolute pitch possessors.
When absolute pitch possessors make errors in pitch naming, they are frequently
octave errors or errors of one semitone (e.g., Lockhead & Byrd, 1981). The third
experiment showed that subjects were not inclined to equate notes separated by a
semitone in preference ratings (although production attempts were sometimes
only one semitone apart).

Neuropsychological Extensions
Within neuropsychology, some recent attention has been paid to the neuropsy
chology of music, or the search for understanding which brain structures may
mediate musical tasks (for reviews, see Zatorre, 1984; Peretz & Morais, 1988).
Although some would like to believe that musical skills "live" in the right
hemisphere as a neat analogue to language in the left, the real situation is more
complicated than that. The most common situation for finding musical deficits
after right hemisphere (RH) damage, usually a right temporal lobectomy, has
tended to be in musical discrimination tasks using unfamiliar material. As noted
earlier, this is precisely the typical paradigm used in psychomusicology experi
ments. But one can argue that everyday musical experience more resembles the
auditory imagery experiments I have been describing, where people recall and
sometimes mentally manipulate a highly familiar tune. These experiments sug
gest that people have a very rich representation of everyday tunes.
It is this richness of representation that so far has not been examined in right
hemisphere patients. Zatorre (1985) has shown that, like normals, RH patients
can use the scale and contour of melodies to learn them, although they learn at a
slower rate. But little work has explored what, if any, deficits occur in processing
0verleamed melodies. Will the type of high-level processing required in imagery
tasks be affected by the impaired auditory discrimination that RH patients show?
Or can we show a dissociation between perceptual and memorial skills in music?
Some work by Farah and associates (e.g., 1988) in the visual domain sug
gested that perceptual and memorial skills will be related. By analyzing evoked
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potentials in normal subjects, she has found that nearly identical brain areas are
active in imagery and perception tasks.In brain-damaged patients, she reported
that selective visual deficits are almost always accompanied by selective imagery
deficits.For instance, patients who can recognize objects but not locate them in
vision seem to show the same deficits when consulting a memory representation.
Zatorre and I are currently exploring these possible relationships in music.As
a first step, we had thought to repeat the higher/lower pitch experiment described
earlier, in both imaginal and perceptual versions.We anticipated two problems in
extending this paradigm to the epilepsy surgery patients available to us. One was
the very high error rate in that study, which would probably only increase with a
less educated population suffering from the effects of epilepsy, medication, sur
gery, or all three.The second problem was that the task really requires processing
of verbal (the lyric) and nonverbal (the imagined pitch) components.We thought
this to be unwise if we wanted to compare left (LT) and right temporal lobe
patients (RT), when we know that the former group has trouble with verbal
information in general, and in retrieving the titles of familiar tunes specifically.
To reduce the error rate, we decided to present all trials blocked by song,
instead of randomly. Pilot subjects from this population reported that thinking of
"Puff the Magic Dragon," "Hark the Herald Angels Sing," and then "Happy
Birthday" in rapid succession was difficult.Another decision was to present the
perceptual version of whatever task we chose first, so it could serve as training
for the imagery task. To solve the second problem, we attempted to devise
versions of the task without any verbal components. However, pilot testing with
completely nonverbal versions of the studies showed that even normal controls
find it very difficult to make musical decisions without the benefit of some verbal
cue to the song.
For our study now in progress, we reluctantly returned to a version of the
higher/lower task that uses lyrics, but with minimal verbal memory demands.
First, we screen subjects to make sure that they can make higher/lower judg
ments. Then they get a low memory load or "perceptual" version of the task
where they will see the two critical lyrics highlighted in a line of text: "DASH
ING through the snow in a one-HORSE open sleigh.... " They simultaneously
hear the tune being sung and decide if HORSE is higher or lower in pitch than
DASHING.Finally, after presumably all subjects are very well trained on the
lyrics, a true imagery task simply presents the two words DASHING and
HORSE for judgment.Data gathered on the first small group of patients show
that most people can at least perform these tasks at a reasonable level.
The theoretical problem with tasks having a heavy verbal component is that
both RT and LT patients might show deficits, but for different reasons (impair
ment in verbal or musical skills, respectively).However, this is not a fatal flaw.
Even if people are processing the lyrics as verbal units, the higher/lower judg
ment requires additional access to the musical image.So we can reason that even
if both patient groups will be impaired relative to controls, RTs should still be
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worse than LTs on imaginal and perceptual versions if the right temporal lobe is
"responsible" for the musical image as well as the musical percept.We will also
be examining reaction time patterns to see if the groups vary qualitatively as well
as quantitatively from one another.
Now, if, contrary to prediction, we find no impairment in the patients on the
imagery task, but do find one on the perceptual task, we would then have
evidence for a dissociation between imagery and perception, which would be in
interesting contrast to the results from visual imagery. This would imply that
auditory perception and imagery differ from one another more than is the case in
the visual domain.
Conclusions
Referring back to the issues raised in the Introduction, the "tune inside the head"
is in some ways an apt description of the representation of familiar tunes. These
tunes seem to be stored with much exact or analogue information.People appar
ently need not rely only on such musical abstractions as contour or scale struc
ture, as they do when processing unfamiliar tunes (Dowling, 1978).Real time
passes while auditory images are activated, and the representations apparently
include the fairly absolute information of tempo and pitch, in addition to the
relative information of note and harmony relationships.
Few differences were found in most of the studies that compared imagery and
nonimagery instruction groups. This suggests that imagery representations are
the usual mode of processing familiar tunes.Of course this conclusion will be
tempered by the task asked of the subjects. Thus if I asked a subject to decide
whether the contour of a recently learned tune was the same as the tune I now
present, he or she might very well be able to abstract and consult just the
contours of the two excerpts. However, if I asked someone to draw the contour of
a familiar children's tune (try it with, say, "Old Macdonald"), I propose that the
rich imagery representation is consulted and the contour derived from that.
Some skills using auditory imagery are shared by musicians and nonmusicians
alike. Both groups seem to process auditory images in real time and to perform
judgment tasks equally quickly.Both groups showed evidence of auditory im
ages containing pitch and tempo information.Musicians surpassed the nonmusi
cians in maintaining that information under more difficult memory conditions.
Nonmusicians were susceptible to interference caused by the recognition foils in
the pitch experiments, and were less able than musicians to maintain stable
tempo judgments across sessions in the tempo consistency experiment. In
teresti ngly, nonmusicians had more trouble overall with the tempo experiments
�han with the pitch experiments.One wonders if musical training in general
improves understanding of tempo relationships more so than pitch relationships
,
an area for future research, perhaps .
Pragmatically, the analogies between visual and auditory imagery worked
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reasonably well in generating some of the research program outlined in this
chapter. One intrinsic difficulty in comparing the modalities is the logical prob
lem of presenting truly perceptual tasks in the auditory modality. Almost always,
some memory component will enter into auditory comparisons. Simultaneous
presentations of auditory stimuli are often not practical because of attentional and
fusion effects. In the Introduction I noted that this was a methodological problem
in that performance was likely to be worse on auditory versus visual versions of
the imagery tasks. The theoretical problem, illustrated in the last section on
neuropsychological extensions, is whether one can justifiably compare percep
tual and imaginal tasks in the same way in vision and audition. I think the
analogy cannot be strictly parallel, and the usual situation in audition will involve
comparisons of high versus very low memory load tasks. Hopefully such com
parisons will sometimes yield neuropsychological dissociations, so that compo
nential analysis of auditory tasks can be made easier in future work.
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